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The Issue 
Globalization is, in some senses, a very old phenomenon. Its 
earliest roots are in the spread of humanity from a very local environment 
to the far reaches of the earth, changing the flora and fauna, indeed the 
air, water and soil wherever they went. And later, the globalizing effects of 
such trade routes as the Old Silk Road, tied Asia to Europe, with shipping 
links chat carried not only goods, but ideas, arts, technologies, seeds, 
weapons, diseases, plus religious convictions from East to West and West 
to East, with trader paths extending south to Semitic and African regions 
and north to Slavic and Nordic regions, centuries before Christ and lasting 
well into the West's Middle Ages. The lacer story is better known: sailing 
ships with new methods of navigation brought exploratory, military, 
colonial and missionary activity to these and still other regions, and 
eventually to the New World. Each of these developments increased the 
rapidity of the globalizing process, anticipating what is happening now. 
However, the current form of globalization is new, in part 
because of its magnitude and in part because if its character. It is not only 
expanding our sense of the public world, it is creating a material infra-
structure on a scale chat could eventuate in a world civilization with a 
common virtual world of images and information that is, in principle, 
accessible to all. To be sure, some people still think of the "public" only as 
having to do with policies, but globalization is not a government project, 
and no political regime can comprehend the public it engenders. Indeed, 
the emerging global institutions of regulation and development, such as 
the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, etc., transcend any government's 
program. In fact it is a frequent accusation against chem chat they are 
unregulated by any political order and are too much influenced by the 
interests of multinational economic interests. 
More frequently, people think of globalization primarily in terms 
of the international spread of these corporations and of capitalism more 
generally, which they usually understand in terms derived from either 
neo-Marxist categories of class-conflict (now less the international prole-
tariat vs bourgeoisie than the "first" vs the "third" worlds or the "North" 
vs the "South" or "The West" and "The Rest"), in which the exploited or 
developing peoples of the world stand against the Neo-liberal 
"Washington Consensus" (laissez-faire economics which they often 
identify with Adam Smith, backed by American neo-imperialist power). 
Neither Marxist nor the Neo-liberal are today generally trusted to lead the 
world to a better future, even if many feel that they somehow ought 
morally to side with the proletarian "Rest" against the American-led 
"West". The distrust derives from the suspicion that the one always seems 
co move toward a system that cannot efficiently produce, and the other 
always seems to move toward a system that does not (or will not) equi-
tably distribute, and both seem to violate the ecosystem.2 
Such views are partially right, for many countries which have 
suffered from colonialism and have emerged from it by strong nationalist 
movements find now chat their national political efforts to control their 
own destinies are compromised by the trans-nationalist efforts to extend 
the international economic interests that are at work in globalization. 
Further, in the perception of many, the gap between the rich and the 
powerful on the one hand and the poor and the powerless on the other 
seems to increase. I say "seems to" for the hard evidence for chat is incon-
clusive, controverted, and subject to interpretation by ideological use of 
the data. As I read it, very high percentages of the world's population are 
moving up economically, and while some are moving much more rapidly 
than ochers, and large numbers are being left behind, the most remarkable 
change is the emergence of new middle classes increasingly demanding a 
voice in their societies and expressing a concern for the environment. 
These new middle classes are being created precisely in those countries 
which have most energetically opened themselves to global influences, 
while the greatest poverty remains in those countries most closed to or 
inaccessible co globalizing forces. 3 It appears to be so chat the peak per-
centages of those who are at the very top of income and wealth distri-
bution are further removed from those at the bottom than at any time in 
recent history, this is in part a function of the fact that more and more 
countries of the world have decided chat private institutions do a better 
job of forming and deploying capital than do states. Meanwhile, those 
governments chat seek to control economies are being reshaped by global 
influences, and the rather raw forms of mercantilism posing as capitalism 
have, in authoritarian environments, increasingly replaced communism as 
the economy of choice, aiding local development somewhat but increasing 
inequality. The shifts are effecting every subsistence, feudal, and socialist 
economy, and making the meager skills of the least developed peoples 
obsolete. It is not a pretty picture, although it is likely to be cemporary.4 
Nevertheless, more determinative forces than purely economic 
ones are at work in technology, medicine, law, and education, forces that 
make the economic changes viable, and through the complex of develop-
ments, as Roland Robertson has famously said, "the whole world is 
becoming one place." It is now an inclusive field of spaces, peoples, 
cultures, institutions, practices and activities chat leaves no context 
untouched. Every contextual mode of analysis now must take account of 
chis comprehensive context, and each local context is "glocalizing" as 
aspects of the global forces indigenize and as people from local societies 
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are drawn into wider frames of reference, drifting, for example into the 
exploding mega-cities of the earth and becoming part of the ganglia of the 
growing global network of interaction, information, exchange, and c 
reativity. All this, is not, however, homogenizing culture, as many fear; 
for as local and global influences interact, new pluralizing syntheses are 
being worked out. People re-invent their traditions, selectively adopting 
practices, values, clothing, cuisines, and technical resources from "foreign" 
societies and from their own traditions, as presumed universals become 
modulated by being indigenized and flowering in new ways in local soils 
and newly constructed syntheses. All of this has as many implications for 
religion, as religion does for the dynamics themselves.5 
Those who see globalization only as an economic development 
extending rapacious capitalism or only as a current political development 
chat tends toward a new imperialism are viewing the realities all can see 
too narrowly, for these frequent ways of interpreting these changes are 
rooted in dubious interpretive understandings of how history works. The 
glasses most frequently used to read the situation need re-grinding, and 
this is one of the key tasks of intellectuals who wrestle with the empirical, 
the ethical and the spiritual realities of chis new socio-historical context. 
Seen through other lens, the decisive current changes are largely derivative 
of dynamics chat are obscured by the older spectacles. I refer specifically 
to the impact of religious and theological developments that are reversing 
the number of presumptions about how history works, such as the view 
that the world is "progressively" becoming more secular and chat the "real" 
forces chat drive development are always material - economic or political.6 
In fact, old religious traditions have gradually re-worked their 
way co dominant influence, and new constellations of resurgent religion 
are interacting as cultural forces with political, economic realities to form 
a myriad of new combinations of local and global syntheses - in what 
Berger and Huntington have identified as "many globalizations."7 
Together they generate a vast, world-wide complex of extremely diver-
sified, highly unpredictable, rapidly changing, dynamics that comprehend 
and transform every particular contextual reality and creates the fragile 
prospect of a global civilization, one more complex and differentiated than 
the world has ever known, one chat adopts traditional diversities into its 
ever-extending net, one that has no obvious singularly coherent center. 
This is what we must try co understand both to know what is going on 
and to find the handles to guide the development responsibly, so far as 
possible. 
The main purpose of chis paper is precisely this: to draw upon 
neglected resources, largely from religious insights, chat enable us to refine 
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the ways by which we can understand the various powers and spheres of 
life that are emerging under globalizing conditions and to relate these to 
the fundamental bases of ethics in such a way that it can and should guide 
our responses to chis very complex reality. This implies that to grasp and 
guide current global dynamics we must seek a viewpoint that in some 
sense transcends the world itself, one that allows us, at least in a thought 
experiment, to see something of the whole. The indispensable social 
sciences that study chis phenomenon seldom recognize the fact that reli-
gious and ethical forces are profoundly behind much of what is going on, 
or chat they, even more than these sciences themselves, seek to grasp things 
whole. Bue we cannot see the swamp and know it is a swamp simply by 
immersing oneself ever the more deeply in it. We need perspective plus an 
intimate familiarity with a variety of habitats. Then we can begin to rec-
ognize the multiplicity of forces chat made chis environment different 
from other ones and set forth hypotheses as to how life works everywhere. 
To understand a world phenomenon, one needs a worldview, what some 
call a "metaphysical-moral vision" of the world, which is ever, at least in 
part, a matter of faith - the kind of faith that is able to present publically 
examinable arguments that it is a viable one to hold. 
I am suggesting, in other words, that a theological view, one that 
is rooted in a comprehending view that relativizes every particular context 
in principle without violating the particularities found, has slowly pro-
duced what is now appearing before us in both material and virtual reality. 
Key motifs from the legacy of the Hebraic, and thus also of the Christian 
theological, heritage (and, in certain respects of derivative Islamic tradi-
tions), knew long ago of a single created realm where all peoples lived in a 
multiplicity of contexts under a singular divine law and toward a variety of 
divinely appointed ends in history and beyond. Parallel ideas were to 
some degree present in tribal, Taoist, Confucian and classic Greco-Roman 
philosophies, with parallels to some schools of theistic Hinduism, 
although usually without the notion of a just and loving creator God as 
the source and norm of the realities these traditions sought to interpret. 
Many of these latter great traditions focused on the idea of Nature or 
cosmic reality, not as a created artifact, but as the primal source and norm 
of both society and religion. Thus, only some of the great world-views, 
chose rooted in a transcendent God, have had a sense of a reality that is 
other than the way things are and that nevertheless comprehends creation 
and history. Even the view that modified the naturalistic sensibilities in 
the West B the idea of one humanity with each made in God's image, 
living in the one complex and sinful world, which the one yet triune God 
created, commanded, and commissioned B is old and in principle uni-
versal, even if it is not acknowledged everywhere and by everyone. It 
-
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points to a reality more public, more globally encompassing than any 
particular political or economic system is, any culture can be, and, indeed, 
than any naturalistic conception of the cosmos could imagine. 
It is not only the case that religion is related to the dynamics of 
globalization, it is the claim that something more powerful than nature is 
behind the religious convictions of the world and that both that reality 
and people's belief about it shape politics, economics and culture, and that 
this reality is not, in any ordinary sense of the word, simply "natural". In 
ordinary language, we refer to that reality as "God," and need to explore 
whether and how God is related to globalization. Of course, even if 
believers hold that God is behind all that goes on, we must admit that in 
regard to globalization the connections, if true, are valid in very unsorted 
ways. In my view, that is why our faiths and our theologies based on 
them, and any social ethics legitimated by those theologies, must be 
public. That is, they must not only take up global issues, in the sense that 
it give us the motivation, courage and worldview to address the global 
problems that are arising, but to discern, so far as we are able, any divine 
intent, principles or purposes in the very phenomenon of globalization 
and to evaluate the relative adequacy of various religious responses to 
globalization - inso far as we can do so fairly. 
Thus, I think we must speak not only of ethics for a much 
expanded public, but of an ethic funded by a "public theology." I mean 
by that, a kind of theology that generates a faith-full worldview, recovers 
and recasts certain pertinent historic themes in the history of theology that 
bear on globalization, and challenges any trends in theology that sees all 
normative claims as privileged to specific gender, ethnic, social, or 
convictional groups. It is widely held, today, that we each have our own 
personal theology. Further, each communion of faith has its own confes-
sional theology. The various streams and factions of the Christian tra-
dition, for example, each has its own modes of thought, patterns of 
worship, and ecclesiastical polity. All the various denominations can today 
be seen as so many "orders," some of which seem to carry out their min-
istries best outside of the Mother Church. And yet, we can recognize the 
family resemblance of these streams and factions, and that each shares 
certain elements that are indispensable to the faith as a whole, even if not 
always properly believed and practiced. Wherever these become predom-
inant and enduring, they shape the common life and the wider worlds of 
culture, politics and economics, and, indeed, begin to constitute those 
great religio-social worldviews that shape civilizations. And when the ways 
in which they do so have fundamental implications for all of humanity, 
they become the focus of inter-religious deliberation and debate. Indeed, 
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the most important way of studying these great religions is a critical public 
theology, one deeply informed by comparative philosophy, ethics, and 
social theory. This dimension of theology has only sometimes been 
developed and propagated in our colleges and seminaries, in our ecclesias-
tical councils, and in our missionary efforts as they reached around the 
world, yet it has become indispensable in a globalizing era. Exposure to 
Christian worldviews, and indeed to the forces of globalization partially 
prompted by them, has encouraged several of the other world religions to 
articulate their faiths in revisionist terms that also approximate a public 
theology. 
It is important to develop a "public theology" today, because of 
certain trends in contemporary religion to the contrary. One is the peril 
of Fundamentalistic movements. The growth of lslamist conviction in the 
Arabic world, of Hindu nationalism in India, of Buddhist militance in 
Myanmar and parts of Japan,8 of both pre-millennialist dispensationalism 
and "Radical Orthodoxy" in Christianity tend to obscure the greater forms 
of these traditions and to set the religious agenda for an inevitably "clash 
of civilizations," to use the phrase Huntington made famous. 9 Another is 
sectarianism, reinforced by the relativism of post-modern thinking, against 
any thought of a master narrative. In Christian circles, this appears in a 
misbegotten ignoring ofJohn 3:16-17, so that it is held that God sent 
Christ into the world to save the church, and not the world, and that the 
chief function of the church that follows Christ is to condemn the world. 
It is of course a great thing to bring souls into the church and to 
strengthen communities of faith, but this tendency is today being 
advanced in Christian circles in ways that end up retreating from the 
obligation of serious theology to also provide the moral and spiritual inner 
architecture for shaping the common life, including today the globalizing 
environment. Comparable tendencies are also a temptation of other world 
religions - sometimes in the form of reactionary re-tribalization that wants 
to freeze-dry local religio-cultural traditions against change or more 
comprehensive views of reality. Still a third peril is the credibility of 
many church leaders. I refer not only to sexual and financial scandals 
that discredit religious leadership, but to the fact that few have sought to 
develop a profound public theology able to address the questions that 
globalization pose should be. 
"Globalization" as a dynamic process suggests not only that the 
whole world can be conceived as "one place," a single reality, but as a 
reality involved in a process of change, so that will transcend its present 
reality. It presumes an "already" and "old" nature, indeed a kosmos and 
oikoumene, that are necessary and enduring, but incomplete, flawed, 
-
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unfinished, or distorted; and a "not yet," something "new," that is at least 
promised and possibly coming into being. The question is whether this 
may, or must, be seen as related to a divine intent. The New Testament 
conveys just such views with an idea of "the world" as something that is 
created by God and thus good, but which is fallen, distorted in its opera-
tions, incomplete and imperfect, and thus is something to which we are 
not to conform, even though we cannot in this life depart from the 
deepest structure of its very being without extinction. Yet, "the world" is 
also something that God so loved that it is being redeemed, and those who 
know God also know that they are sent into it, not to conform to it, but 
to aid in its process of redemption, to become agents in its potential trans-
formation toward a new creation and a new civilization. We are to 
participate in the Kingdom that is within us and among us as it presses 
and points toward a New Jerusalem, a symbol of a complex divine city to 
which all the peoples of the earth bring their gifts. 
Those who receive the vision of this promised reign of God are to 
employ every moral means to make it actual. This cluster of convictions 
has periodically become central to Christian conviction, and has emerged 
into most intense consciousness when people find themselves experiencing 
and seeking to guide massive social change. Where it has been strongest, 
the intentional restructuring of the world, selves, and society by con-
version, reconstruction, technology, and social transformation becomes a 
moral duty. 10 That is a second reason why a public theology is required as 
we consider globalization, for this cluster of convictions stands deep 
behind the contemporary dynamics of globalization. In our best under-
standings of creation and redemption, we can see God at work in global-
ization. Indeed, at the World Missionary Conference of 1910, as the 
effects of the new trans-continental cables were first being realized, and 
the massive effects of industrialization and urbanization were visible to 
nearly all, the great scholar and missionary, J. N. Farquhar, spoke for 
many of those first recognizing the dynamic of what we now call global-
ization: "We have entered a new era.... The nations have become one city; 
we buy each other's goods, ... we think each other's thoughts, ... we begin to 
hear the music of humanity." 11 
He echoed, then, what the biblical record promised; he failed to 
see, however, how the powers generated by such developments could also 
be distorted by sin into colonialism and imperialism, which accompanied 
the missionary movement and modernization, and how the response to 
these could also spur reactionary movements. Mixing peoples, cultures, 
and religions offended both the neo-pagans and radical secularizers of the 
last century. The radical right and the radical left attached sacred meaning 
to their own "blood and soil" or class, and interpreted them in terms of 
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the idyllic memories of a lost primal community. 12 And the technologies 
that had made the new internationalism possible could generate both new 
methods of productivity and economic interdependency and new possibil-
ities of destructive weaponry, both of which in turn uprooted traditional 
cultures. The "music of humanity," of which Farquhar spoke, was soon 
disrupted by a cacophony of military marches and accompanied by the 
percussion of bombs in history's shortest half-century, 1914-1946, and 
history's shortest century, 1918-1989, when modern social, political and 
economic ideologies, nearly all of them anti-religious, clashed in World 
Wars, hot and cold. The most important transitions are seldom by 
smooth progress, and almost never without resistence and storms of 
threatened apocalypse. 
Yet, Farquhar's forecast turned out to be essentially true: the 
pagan right and the secular left, the twin enemies of the democracy, 
human rights, economic freedom, and the humane use of technology were 
defeated. And each of these developments, which they opposed, were not 
only stamped by strands of the Christian view of a universal faith, but 
became instrumental in the defeat of these struggles to contain these 
globalizing forces. & a result, history became increasingly planetary. 
Now, no state can be fully sovereign, no economy whole within itself, and 
no culture entirely self-contained, while religion is in resurgence every-
where. This is now the context in which we now think, work, pray and 
play, and seek to carry out our vocations. It now comprehends many spe-
cific locales and sub-cultures only partially linked in a dynamic pluralism. 
Life, is now not only simultaneously global and local, it is also ecumenical 
and contextual, catholic and congregational, in part because we live in a 
period of "the compression of the world," which, in spite of America's role 
as a super-power, is not only multipolar politically (with temporary 
hegemonies which lesser powers cooperate to restrain), but multi-cultural, 
and increasingly linked technologically, economically, politically, culturally, 
and morally - even if some are, at least for now, left out since it is all 
happening, as John Paul II has pointed out, "over their heads" - a telling 
phrase that indicates not only that they do not understand what is going 
on, but that these developments as pressing down on them. 
I fully recognize that the Unites States, as the only remaining 
superpower, is tempted in this context to a new imperialism. We do not 
yet know whether the world's only remaining superpower will become, by 
choice or by accident, at least for a time the new hegemonic power -
following in the train of old Rome, the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, 
the British Empire (in competition with Dutch, Spanish, French, and 
German) that in the midst of the modern European balance of powers 
kept a semblance of peace, fostered the economic development of the 
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West, and, it must be said, eventuated in colonialism - if the nations with 
dynamic cultures could not expand at home because they were constrained 
by their neighbors, they expanded abroad in a series of competing empires. 
But most Americans are not eager to take this role. They do not see our-
selves as an empire, either solo or as one of several. They do not aspire to 
rule the world, we don't want to take responsibility for every rogue nation 
or petty tyrant, every ethnic war or territorial conflict, even if the role is 
thrust upon us because the USA is the only serious military power and 
because, since World War II, it has already established bases around the 
world and other countries, living under the defense umbrella of American 
troops and weaponry, have allowed their own military prowess to wither. 
Besides, if we are to become a military power, it will cost. And there are 
enough residues of isolationist Americanism around that people will not 
want to pay for other people's problems. Most would prefer to be loved 
and admired, and to get on with the business of business, expanding the 
world economy and making everyone better off. Furthermore, the forms 
of faith that in the past helped develop the inner moral architecture for 
guiding public affairs have fallen silent or become ideological. Religion, in 
the dominant evangelical modes that convertS souls and establishes local 
megachurches, has no intrinsic social philosophy - although some are 
turning to certain Roman Catholic or Reformed models. 13 And both the 
"mainline" Protestant and radical Catholic voices focus on "liberation" in 
all things, but do not specify how the institutional life of humanity could 
be ordered. A new ''Americanist" cultural arrogance fills the gap. 
What are we then to think and to do about such a situation? 
Obviously, we must advocate for and provide resources through public 
and private charitable channels to those who are left behind, and support 
those who work directly with those left behind. Bur another level of intel-
lectual and organizational work also needs to be done. And on this front, 
the only way to grasp what is going on is to recognize the insight of the 
world religions that life is not only governed by the material forces that 
determine much of life - nature and the lusts for power, wealth and the 
desire for things - but also by immaterial realities. I refer to those spir-
itual energies capable of evoking loyalties and channeling freedom that 
grab our souls and possess the esprit de corps of our social organizations. 
In many cultures and sub-cultures, people live in a world of enchanted 
powers - a world populated by spirits that can be invoked, demons that 
must be exorcized, or charms and curses that may be used. Elaborate 
systems develop around these concerns, and every religion has adherents 
who use even their faith in such ways, even if clergy discourage it. To be 
sure, some "super-personal forces of good and evil" 1• are identified in other 
terms by the modern social sciences. They speak of "complexes" or of 
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"totems" and "taboos," or report on ideas of "fate," "fortune," "karma," 
"kismet," etc., as believed by one or another cultural and religious tra-
dition, although they do not believe that any cosmic logic or supra-natural 
force really determines behavior. Today, genetics, social location, and eco-
nomic interests, plus various "isms" or "archetypal patterns" developed 
through evolution are taken as explanations of the powers that make us do 
what we do. All these tell us that we have no choice but to live out what 
these powers dictate. Concerns about the powers vary from person to 
person, culture to culture, and epoch to epoch; but they are always 
present. Psychology, anthropology, and sociology must, I believe, face the 
issues they pose; but only a theological view can touch the depths needed 
to see what is at stake in globalization. And here we can see at least one 
dimension of reality named by the ancient faith as "powers, principalities, 
authorities, thrones, and dominions." These terms point toward the 
driving energies that are real in social history and now again exposed by 
globalization, for the traditions that ordered them are being fundamentally 
deconstructed. But these "forces," these "powers" need redefinition. 
Among the most salient of the powers for our questions are what 
we have called the "Principalities." Traditionally viewed as personified 
angelic spirits that rebelled against their Creator and thus become dis-
torted into demonic, idolatrous forms, and today viewed often as totally 
impersonal psycho-social forces, the terms eros, mammon, mars, and the 
muses point to inchoate, animating realities that are present in every 
known society. They are, more or less, always ethically constrained, chal-
lenged or channeled by religion, which, if it successfully allowed a proper 
place for them, tended to harness these powers so that they would con-
tribute to an enduring civilization in which life can flourish. These 
powers are constrained, challenged and channeled by the religious legiti-
mation of institutional matrices that provide moral and spiritual housing 
for them. Thus, normative forms of family life with their patterned ways 
of relating males and females and parents and children channel eros, and 
if this power is not channeled, family life and sexual behavior becomes 
destructive, not constructive. Similarly, dominant arrangements of the 
division of labor with modes of approved production and distribution 
order mammon, and if these are woven into responsible institutional 
orders, exploitation, corruption, and deception becomes the common coin 
of economic life. In the same way, political authority with a legally and 
morally bound power to exercise a monopoly on legitimate coercion con-
trols violence when it invades from abroad or erupts from within, but 
unconstrained mars becomes unconstrained militarism. And culture-
defining narratives and images (folk-tales; national epics; traditional 
dances, painting, sculptural, architecture and musics) and whole languages 
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with idioms provide possibilities of communication and the clarification of 
meanings; but without a sense that the muses can be creative under higher 
principles and purposes than to deconstruct meanings, they become a 
babble of idolatrous frauds. 
These are the primary spheres that are functional prerequisites of 
existence in every society, necessary for viable community. They contain 
and provide the social-ethical space for those powers that can grasp the 
soul and become obsessive forces in the lives of people or sub-cultures -
becoming part of what the biblical tradition calls "the Principalities," as 
already mentioned. None of the prevailing ways of constraining, chal-
lenging, and channeling the primal powers of eros, mammon, mars and 
the muses - that is, family, economy, politics, and culture - are compre-
hensible without attention to the way these institutional spheres of life are 
religiously shaped in every culture, and the fact that they nevertheless have 
a tendency to assert their own potency and meanings against any con-
straining, challenging or channeling limits. To use biblical language, these 
angelic powers can make idols of their own potency and thus become 
demonic. One can no more understand the prevailing patterns of familial, 
economic, political or cultural life in India without attention to 
Hinduism, or in the Arabic world without attention to Islam, or the 
East Asian world without reference to the Confucian tradition, or the 
West without attention to Christianity than one can grasp the corrupt 
subcultures of any of these lands when eros, or mammon, or mars, or the 
muses become sovereign. If societies are disrupted by the destruction of 
their religious core, or if a new attempt to reconstruct a religious core does 
not provide for the constraint, challenging and channeling of these 
powers, we can expect the rise of sexual, economic, military, and cultural 
disarray. Moreover, we can expect fundamentalist and sectarian reactions 
to the fact that the operating norms and values of the necessary institu-
tions of ordinary life are increasingly cluttered with the chaos of moral 
confusion. 15 They may not have solutions to the problems, but they may 
see the problems before the primary custodians of the moral fiber of civi-
lization do. 
One of the key realities of globalization is that this is happening 
now, and it is happening essentially under the influence of another set of 
powers that have developed a quite different set of institutional forms that 
are, in substantial measure, instigators and carriers of globalization. The 
powers that are behind these spheres of life may also be rather universal in 
human experience, but unlike the "Principalities", however, these have 
only sometimes developed distinct and highly influential institutional 
matrices to advance them. These are more clearly "modern" historical cre-
ations, not naturally or necessarily present in all viable societies. Primary 
11 
among them are the "modern" professions - education, law, medicine, and 
engineering, especially bio-engineering, geo-engineering and socio-engi-
neering - this third one is commonly called "management." We may call 
these the ''Authorities" of modern life, for these practices and behaviors 
have created spheres of life that are now populated by experts to whom 
everyone turns in times of difficulty. They not only claim to understand 
and help manage our erotic worlds, but our worlds of mammon, mars and 
the muses when they seem disordered, but they also claim to posses and 
know how to guide the "good" powers: scientia, ~, salus, and techne. 
It is more than interesting that every culture has its own tradi-
tions for teaching and learning, procedures for adjudication of disputes or 
criminal behavior, for dealing with birthing and healing, and developing 
techniques for the principal activities of life. The teacher, initiator, guru, 
or "master" is known in every society; so is the "judge" or "council, the 
mid-wife and medicine-man, the craftsman and the experimenter; but 
only some cultures have developed elaborate institutional forms for culti-
vating and extending the influence of these Authorities. In fact, only in 
the West, specifically traceable to the ways in which the church interacted 
with, and often against, royal authorities, do we find the development of 
what is now commonly accepted around the world - the school and the 
university independent of the crown, constitutions and courts above the 
rulers, hospitals and clinics as non-governmental organizations, research 
institutes and management training centers separate from the regimes of 
the world, and professional associations differentiated from the nation-
state. Historically, we can show that each of these areas was cultivated by 
the church in a long and deep history as a part of a deep Christian sense 
of vocation to serve God and the people. Indeed, when missionaries went 
to other cultures, they not only sought to convert persons and establish 
churches, but they introduced modern schools, constitutional law with 
human rights, modern medicine and new technologies and modes of man-
agement. Now, each of these areas of activity and institutional order has 
networks of professional associations that reach around the world. 16 
However, in their modern form, these areas of thought and 
activity have largely divorced themselves from any overt theological, and 
sometimes from any overt ethical content. Science and the modern 
research university have left religion largely behind, even if many scientists 
and professors are religious and certain religious traditions are the womb 
out of which science and the university were born. Medical training and 
contemporary hospitals have a place for chaplains, more or less, and many 
medical personnel may be religious, but the role of theology in the func-
tional side of medical training, psychiatric treatments and health-care 
delivery systems is marginalized - even at the local Mount Sinai, St. 
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Mary's, or Presbyterian hospital. And the very idea that God's law, or any 
divinely ordered natural law, or a universal moral law written into the 
hearts of all, and the notion that lawyers are above all "called" to actualize 
the "holy righteousness" of "justice" would be ridiculed in the first year of 
law school. And so on one could go with the various forms of engi-
neering; those on the cutting edge of technology seldom, if ever, see them-
selves obeying the divine command to have "dominion" over the earth, to 
repair (so far as possible) the disruptions in creation brought by "the fall," 
and to use the gifts of "the mechanical arts" closer to the vision of the 
New Jerusalem. 
It is not that these spheres of professional life are entirely 
immoral, it is that they represent fragmented and fragmenting under-
standings of reality that, when exported to other societies around the 
world both attract for their competency and repel due to their spiritual 
emptiness. In each of these areas, to be sure, new courses in professional 
ethics are being developed or already being taught; but they seldom touch 
the moral and spiritual depths necessary for guiding the modern profes-
sional. Besides, as the authorities of science, law, medicine, and tech-
nology are exported around the world, the theories they advance appear to 
others as utterly devoid of morality, yet they disrupt the religious convic-
tions and the ethos formed by indigenous religious traditions and 
undercut spiritual and ethical bases of cultural life. The responses of fun-
damentalism, re-tribalization and moral sectarianism, or the use of the 
marvelous technical resources of these authorities to exploit the envi-
ronment and the people are quite understandable. Any one of these 
authorities, can bring death to a society, as we saw in the holocausts and 
gulags of the last century. And now, in our new global situation, it is a 
serious question whether they can help form a new civilization - the need 
of our time. 
Both the ancient, perennial "Principalities" and the historic, culti-
vated ''Authorities" are "Powers" that were rooted in theological develop-
ments that can be identified with the common grace of creation and with 
the historic grace of providence; but few "experts" in these areas see no 
need for the special grace of salvation other than what they think they, 
themselves, can supply. The leaders of the modern Authorities particularly 
have gradually shed any sense of a need for that, and have become highly 
ambiguous in their relationship to anything theological and thus about 
any divinely rooted sense of calling to serve humanity. They have the 
traces of these roots deep within them, although they celebrate their 
autonomy and seek to supply their own foundations - a project that 
Nietzsche saw through and that is now generally challenged by post-
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modern critiques. It is not that these authorities never serve humanity, 
but the systematic exclusion of normative considerations in these fields 
blocks out any consciousness of their own roots, guiding principles or 
ultimate ends, and that means that they can easily become distorted, with 
no inner spiritual gyroscope and no deep moral rudder to guide what they 
do. The increased world-wide access to education brought by the mis-
sionary movement and institutionalized in modernity at the hands of the 
state is one of its greatest triumphs of the last several centuries; but the 
sense of "the dying of the light"' 7 among theological and ethical critics of 
today's institutions of higher learning may not yet have produced the right 
answers in every respect, but they signal a declining confidence in the fact 
that a purely secular mode of learning is good for the increase of wisdom. 
The legal development of constitutional law with guarantees of human 
rights has brought the forms of modern political order to increasing 
numbers of lands around the globe, and where these become deeply 
rooted, the host cultures tend to flourish. But they do not become deeply 
rooted if their basic presuppositions are not overtly stated and believed; 
they become manipulated voting charades to mask and perpetuate 
tyranny. So also with engineering: technological transfer can help eco-
nomic development and reduce drudgery; but if the metaphysical assump-
tions behind modern technology, which are religious in nature, are not 
acknowledged, and at least selectively embraced, the apparatus that tech-
nological transfer brings will be left to rust in the dust. Or, if they are 
adopted as entirely morally neutral techniques, they can be used to build 
weapons of mass destruction, to clone humanoids, to build grandiose 
palaces or cathedrals temples or monuments to the glory of local war-
lords. 
It is doubtful that anything can provide the inner moral and spir-
itual fiber to these spheres than a theologically grounded ethic. Only a 
way of thinking and believing that acknowledges a moral and spiritual 
reality beyond what humans construct out of their interests and imagi-
nation can restrain the arrogant egoism of the elites and encourage the 
weak and the victims to seek a better truth and justice than what they 
offer. Indeed, the only power that has a chance of shaping, constraining, 
challenging, and channeling these powers is religion, feeble as it appears to 
be from the outside. But if we turn to this issue, we must consider the 
third, and indeed the most important, set of "Powers" that are in global-
ization. If religion is a critical factor in understanding whence global-
ization came, and guiding its directions to that it becomes a blessing and 
not a curse to humanity, what shall our theology entail, and what shall we 
think of the world religions? How can we expect them to interact, and, 
even more, how shall we treat them? The many dimensions of this 
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question are now under heated debate about pluralism and the new sub-
discipline of Theology of Religions. 18 
Our question is this: since we can easily encounter a pluralism of 
religions in a globalizing world, and we can choose among them, what 
kind of religion shall we choose? Or, to put it another way for our issues, 
what kind of religious orientation can provide the inner spiritual and 
moral architecture for an immensely complex civilization, yet, while 
setting the basic convictional skeleton of the new global civil society so 
that it is both as meaning-full and as just as human societies can be, can 
also keep the society sufficiently open that any who are not persuaded may 
find a place of freedom and tolerance while they confess, practice, and 
advocate some other religion or ultimate world-view. 
At this point we must introduce the concept of the "Dominions," 
a word taken from the Latin for "Lord" - dominus. It makes a great deal 
of difference whether the center(s) of human loyalty is. For that will 
shape the socio-cultural decisions as to whom the regnant lord (or lords) 
of the globalization process and the possible new civilization to which the 
people around the world turn to guide their responses to globalization are. 
This will determine what it is that guides the formation of the emerging 
material basis of an interdependent economy, the new global civil society 
that supercedes the nation-states of the world, and overarching features of 
the increasingly common culture. Shall we turn to the Spirits of the 
Elders and of Nature as we find them dominating every decision in life 
among most traditional tribal peoples? Or shall we turn to the wisdom of 
Master Kung as we find it in the classic Confucian empires of East Asia; or 
the spirituality of Lord Krishna or Lord Shiva as we find them portrayed 
in the great moral epics of the Indian sub-continent; or the stark 
enlightened insights of Lord Buddha as he is honored in the temples of 
South-East Asia, or the great warrior-Prophet Mohammed as followed in 
the Arabic world; or Christ. 19 Or is it the case that a quasi-religious 
Enlightenment-driven view of humanity and progress (neo-Liberal, evolu-
tionary or revolutionary) can guide the future? 
All these religiously formed civilizations, in varying degrees and 
with varying degrees of effectiveness, have formed institutional nerworks 
that order and guide the Principalities, and many have developed sophisti-
cated ways of dealing with what we here call the Authorities, at least in 
their early forms. But sooner or later, we have to ask what kinds of civi-
lizations they lead to (in principle and in fact) and what kinds of justice, 
cultural and intellectual vitality, economic prosperity and spiritual 
integrity they foster. Yet to pose these questions can be explosive, and 
much study of religions is "non-theological" and "non-evaluative." Indeed, 
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the academic approach to religion is often much like popular opinion in 
this: many want the religions to be viewed as if they are all of equal worth 
and a matter of personal background or choice, or of accidental cultural 
development. The American experience, in which we try very hard not to 
discriminate against persons whether they are Baptist or Catholic, 
Presbyterian or Pentecostal, Muslim or Marxist, does not equip us to see 
what is at stake in our global setting. This wonderfully tolerant per-
spective with regard to the faith of individual persons, which should be 
spread across the globe, nevertheless hides the fact that each of the great 
world religions in fact judges the kinds of persons the other religions tend 
to produce and, even more, how the various religions structure marriage, 
politics, culture, economics, and professional life - in short, how they 
form civilizations. The question that this raises is whether we can identify 
any more valid or less valid forms of religious belief and practice specifi-
cally both as they reflect the true divine reality and as they shape persons 
and the Powers of the common life. People do make such judgments, but 
the decisive question is whether we can evaluate the "Lords" fairly and 
wisely, at least in terms of their ability to shape a viable global civilization? 
Tribal peoples have formed societies under the influence of tradi-
tional religions that could integrate patterns of family, economic, political, 
and cultural life in specific niches. These religions and patterns of life 
never completely disappear, but in the long story of globalization, they 
have been increasingly absorbed into cultures formed by the so-called 
"high" religions - Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and, of 
course, Christianity. In fact Hindu missionaries are today actively working 
among the tribal peoples of India, Islam is expanding among tribal peoples 
in equatorial Africa, and Christianity continues to grow in southern 
Africa, Latin America, in south and south-east Asia. These larger, more 
complex religions have in turn formed highly complex and differentiated 
societies, with refined systems of education, law, medicine and technology 
for, at least, elite males; but nearly always they have formed command-
societies that are ruled from the top down. They have, to be sure, done 
this in different ways: Confucian-influenced societies since the Han 
dynasty substantially unified the tribes of China, almost always find their 
center in the Emperor, with educated elites serving both as bureaucratic 
administrators and as priestly advisors under and for him, and their subor-
dinates working among the people. At the lower levels the father of each 
extended family serves as the little emperor over his household. All are to 
work to order the whole of society into a single, integrated unit that is in 
harmony with heaven and earth. All outsiders - including remaining 
ethnic minorities in their little niches, Tribal Muslim in the northwest or 
Tibetan Buddhists in the southwest, plus today the Falun Gong and 
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Independent Christians - are expected to give it honor and pay it tribute, 
with a heavy price if they do not. That vision has been perpetuated under 
Chinese Communism, with the Chairman replacing the Emperor, in title, 
and the party ideologists replacing the Mandarin literati. We can get a 
glimpse of what a globalized world would look like, should this deep tra-
dition become the model of the emerging world order, and today China is 
enthusiastically globalizing faster than any other developing country, cau-
tiously confident that it can adapt modern forms of education, law, med-
icine and technology into a new solidarity with Chinese characteristics. 
Ironically, however, the desire for technology of computers with its new 
access to the internet, the formation of independent corporations as state-
managed economic institutions falter, and the agreements to international 
law not controllable from the center, for instance when China joined the 
WTO, introduce profoundly different value systems that could be indi-
gestible and modify the system; but many intellectuals see the adoption of 
these into the Chinese way of preparing China to become the world's next 
superpower, to which all will pay tribute. 
The Hinduism of India presents a different possibility. It has not 
homogenized the tribal peoples and ethnic groups of India into a single 
people under the rule of an imperial series of dynasties, it has stacked 
them one on top of another in a very distinct hierarchy of communal 
identities, the famous "caste system." It is quite proper to call this system 
hierarchical, for the root meaning of the term (heiros) has to do with the 
rule of the priests, and at the top of the Indian system are the Brahmans. 
In large measure, they and their subordinate allies, the warriors and gov-
erning classes of every province and region, control the educational, 
media, and ideological systems that guide cultural, legal, political and eco-
nomic policies. The caste system is troubling to Christians (and Marxists) 
in India, and generated new forms of radical grass-roots action among the 
Dalits - those groups who used to be called "outcastes" or "harijans." 
These groups have adopted ideas of normative human equality from 
Christianity and from the Enlightenment, and while India has become the 
world's largest democracy in the sense that all qualified adults can vote and 
a free press is vibrant, the view that society should not be hierarchical 
simply does not register. New Dalit-governed institutions, including large 
sections of the Christian church, remain decidedly hierarchical. Of 
course, say leading Hindu advocates, every civilization is governed by 
dominant spiritual ideals, and any empirical look at humanity will reveal 
that every society is constituted by ethnic and culturally defined relative 
approximations to those ideals, and the classic Hindu recognition of 
natural hierarchy is the way things really ultimately are. To deny this is to 
deny reality. This is one of the great, enduring world-models of how to 
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organize a complex civilization, and India is the second most rapidly 
globalizing land on earth, dominated by an amazingly rich and complex 
religious heritage. 
This heritage was, in considerable substance, repudiated by 
Buddhism, which nevertheless preserved many of the devotional practices 
and social attitudes that stood at the margins of Hindu thought. 
Especially important are two developments - the radical focus on the state 
of spiritual consciousness in the individual person, rather than in the 
social status and duties given by birth and social rank; and the acceptance 
of the leadership of royalty in all external matters. Buddhism, thus, tends 
toward a "two-agent" theory of reality - the self must deal with the inner 
world, detaching the mind and heart from those worldly desires and 
attachments that bring suffering; and the king must deal with the outer 
world, prudently providing an ordered environment where laity and non-
believers can form their families, grow their crops, do their business, and 
cultivate their inner detachment from the material distractions of the 
earth. This tradition has, thus, been attracted to and attractive of kingly 
support, and rulers often see the monasteries and temples, which they 
build, as providing a haven for spiritual growth among the spiritually sen-
sitive, and an opportunity for any who make offerings to them to share in 
their merit. This model has been most profoundly developed, in different 
ways, in Sri Lanka, Indochina, Tibet, and pans of China and Japan; but 
its social forms are under threat everywhere and it has not produced 
dynamic cultural or economic developments that clearly can contribute to 
a global future. It inevitably adapts to the authority structure of its host 
culture. However, Buddhism as a personal spiritual discipline and quest 
has contributed enormously to many persons, and, heavily to post-Jewish 
and post-Christian intellectuals in the West, including many who hold 
"new age" perspectives and basically trust a secular, liberal democracy to 
solve social problems, for it provides a richer spiritual psychology than that 
developed by much of modern Western psychology, which it holds to be 
the decisive religious issue. 
As critically as we may look at these options, here all-to-briefly 
sketched, we have to admit that the social visions most systematically 
identified with Master Kung, Lord Krishna, and Lord Buddha are not 
entirely alien to parts, pieces, and periods of Christian history. Those 
deep, now obscure battles between popes and emperors, bishops and 
kings, monk and patriarch in our Western social history parallels these 
alternatives in substantial measure. The ideal of the Constantinian empire 
approximated the Chinese model of a ruling empire, with priests as its 
chaplains and agents, a model not far from those worked out in some of 
the Eastern Orthodox Christian traditions, as well as that of the Anglican 
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establishment after Henry VIII. At other times, rulers deferred to the 
authority of the curia, while the bishops' estates, social prestige and artistic 
patronage were large, and populist, crusading armies marched at the 
command of religious leaders - not far removed from the Hindutva move-
ments in India. And, in a general sort of way, the Buddhist division 
between inner spirituality and external deferment to political authority 
parallels some developments that have taken place in Christian Evangelical 
thought, from Luther to contemporary neo-Evangelicalism. None of these 
are likely to fade soon; but it is also doubtful that they can offer a com-
pelling and just vision for our global future. 
Of course, Islam is the other great non-Christian tradition, and it 
does have a profound vision of the world, and it has a sense of its God-
given duty to bring the whole world under its rule. While millions of 
believers have found a way to understand God and the purposes of life 
through this great tradition, our task here is to identify, so far as we are 
able, its possible contribution to the ordering of a global future. As I 
understand it, Islam can be said to be essentially theocratic in social-
political conception; heavily legalistic in its understanding of how to order 
the practice of the religion, the conduct of personal life, and the ordering 
of the common life, and, although I must say this with due caution, pri-
marily fundamentalistic in its view of the authority of its holy scripture. 
In this regard, it is similar to certain developments in the Judaism of the 
ancient world, and to Protestant fundamentalism as it developed especially 
in the last century or so in America. We are today in the process of trying 
to understand whether these features of Islam are intrinsic to it, or 
whether they are contemporary eruptions in Islam, as their parallels have 
been in both Judaism and Christianity. And while it is wrong for any 
regime to declare war on any religion, as all of the religions here men-
tioned had done at one time or another, it is unlikely that the present 
powers of the world will allow this vision to come to dominate the global 
future. 
Christians, of course, think that the true Lord has been revealed 
in time and life, as well as in the very structure and dynamics of creation 
and the moral law written on the hearts of each person, and that in Jesus 
Christ we can see what the character of a true and just lordship that estab-
lishes dominion, but not domination, really is. This draws us into dis-
cipled patterns of service and purpose that are able to transform our 
hearts, minds, and relationships, and to alter the regencies of the world -
of patriarchal elders, of emperors, of priestly hierarchies, of royalty, and of 
theocrats. The issue is whether Christ's Lordship can today reframe the 
Powers, strengthening the Principalities under new conditions, and com-
pellingly call the Authorities to rediscover and revitalize their spiritual and 
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moral roots so that they may enhance a common domain of disciplined 
service to God and humanity. And can this Lord also reshape the other 
Dominions too? Can He help them find ideas of new possibilities in their 
own traditions and lift them into new levels of relationship, mutuality, and 
ethical coherence? We do not know for certain, but we can glimpse parts 
of the vision that we can pray will come to prominence. 
Two great models of what Christianity offers on this front have 
been developed, and a third is acknowledged as helpful in certain respects. 
The idea of covenant is among the central concepts of the biblical tra-
dition, and was long understood in biblical times to be the paradigmatic, 
providential way of structuring the institutions of the common life in 
accord with God's law and purposes while simultaneously pointing all 
spheres of society toward redemptive possibilities. That connection needs 
to be recovered and recast for our contemporary situation.20 
There are, of course, different forms of covenant, implied already 
in the different terms in the Hebrew bnai berit and baalei berit, for 
example, and in the ways they are translated and adapted into other cul-
tural-linguistic contexts: diatheke and sometimes syntheke or even mysterion 
(Greek), testamentum, compactum, sacramentum, or foedus (Latin), in the New 
Testament and early Christian writings, and later in social, political, and 
legal thought as pact, compact, federation, confederation, Bund (German; 
"bond" or "bounden duty" in old English), alliance (French), and thus 
holy league, agreement, or mutual promise, to name the most frequent 
usages in western languages. I list all these meanings so that we can note 
the frequency and social overtones of these terms and see how pervasive 
and thick with implications the idea can be. All these terms refer to a 
God-given capacity to voluntarily "bond" persons, peoples, or institutions 
into communities of commitment that otherwise would remain in iso-
lation or conflict. Covenant forms a matrix of interacting consociations 
that makes peace, justice, mutual obligation and care more probable, 
because all persons and parts of the complex, diversified social system see 
themselves under a divinely given and grace-full higher moral law and 
called to a more ultimate purpose in life, one that serves God's purposes 
for humanity beyond mere survival or success. This is the basic pattern 
behind the great ecumenical councils and synods of Christian history. 
Indeed, in every genuine covenant, six elements are present: The Divine is 
disclosed in the midst of history. Mutual promises are made. A new com-
munity of confederated communities is formed. Duties and rights are 
accepted. Freedom and justice are made constitutional. And a vision of a 
new, holy future for civilization is opened to and for all. 
Covenant has sometimes been interpreted in tribalistic or nation-
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aliscic ways. But under Christ's dominion, it not only surpasses chose, but 
contrasts with two other models chat have become decisive in many cul-
tures. One is the hierarchical-subsidiary model chat has become central to 
the Catholic tradition, with its parallels, as mentioned, to aspects of the 
Confucian and Hindu models. And the ocher is the individualistic-con-
tractual one, which was part of the old structure of Roman law, developed 
further by the Enlightenment social philosophies, and was largely accepted 
by the French Revolution's view of the social contract in one form and by 
the Industrial Revolution's view of commercial contracts in another. Boch 
have elements chat potentially overlap with the covenant idea, and in some 
aspects of life each of these two has a distinct role. Each can become a 
form of grace. 
In my view, we need to have a rebirth of the confederation model 
of covenant, one that recognizes the relative role of hierarchical leadership 
and subsidiarity and of temporal contracts in particular contexts. I 
emphasize chis matter today, for it appears char the United States, rooted 
in the covenant idea as it generated our constitutional democracy, may 
now be assuming the role of an imperial power, and celebrating, or even 
imposing, the commercial contractual model on all human relationships. 
But if the United States does presume to become the policeman of the 
world, it had better know what model it is adopting and why, how it is 
going co relate to the ocher models, and whether it wants to bring creative 
forms of grace or impose arbitrary will. The forms of state power and 
individualistic self-celebration that are so prominent today, are unlikely to 
suffice either in forming alliances to discern and enforce just principles or 
in providing a graceful vision for the shape of a pose-war world, should 
chat become an eventuality. 
If the global trends continue, and are modified and adopted, even 
if begrudging by the peoples of the world, we can say chat not only would 
the confederated covenantal model of the common life find a new arena of 
incarnation that has implications for the emerging global civil society, but 
chat globalization, understood in its more complex meanings, could be 
"for good" -- both lasting and for human well-being. It could promote a 
highly pluralistic global civilization with increased prospect for peace with 
justice. In the final analysis, however, it is unlikely co happen unless it 
finds its focus in Christ as Lord, for Christ is the one who has, and can 
ever and again, renew the covenant between God and humanity, and point 
souls toward reconciliation with God and neighbor, and societies coward a 
New Jerusalem. This, in my view, does not mean that everyone in the 
world must become Christian; but it does mean that both non-Christian 
and many Christian traditions may have to be modified in chis direction 
on this point - just as many have adopted the principles of Human 
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Rights, which historically derive from nowhere else than from certain 
streams of the Christian heritage. Of course, such a modification cannot 
be forced, it has co be adopted on its moral and spiritual, as well as its 
practical merits. Yet we might want to acknowledge chat for some, such a 
modification would mean something like a modest conversion of the tra-
ditions. This would, or could, become a means of grace to and for the 
world in a structural sense. 
One other motif needs to be mentioned as I draw to a conclusion 
- a motif that needs further development and joint study. This is the 
notion that under such a confederaced-covenantal system, individual 
persons, especially chose in the bureaucratized modern authorities, the 
proliferating professions of the global world, have to be prepared to see 
their moral and spiritual way through the complexities of these new areas 
of life, and to integrate chem, better than is often done at chis rime, into 
patterns of ordinary family, culcural, and daily economic existence. In 
brief, both the Principalities and the Authorities of modern life have to be 
drawn again into a deeper sense of vocation than now appears to be the 
case. 
This, I propose, is one of the great responsibilities of the church 
and parallel religious communities in our time. We need public rheo-
logical educational programs at all levels, from religiously informed ethics 
courses in the professional schools to rituals of commissioning chat invite 
school teachers, pharmacists, law clerks, and lab technicians as well as sci-
entists and professors, doctors and nurses, lawyers and judges, engineers 
and researchers form both the internal value system around a valid and 
vibrant religious conviction, and a sense of calling in regard to what they 
do. This can and should cohere with other obligations that one has in life 
- family, responsible use of financial resources, being a responsible citizen 
and supporting cultural creativity, for instance. Some of chis has begun, 
but it is still feeble and fractured. To mount such a project, a new ecu-
menical interaction of Protestant notions of vocation and covenant with 
Orthodox and Roman Catholic sensibilities about sacrament and rite and, 
even more, with classic understandings of formation and genuine 
catholicity will have to be culcivaced. Of course, chis would mean calling 
upon an insecure clergy to renew itself, and to cake on questions and 
issues chat have, in recent centuries, often been far from their training or 
self-understanding. Still, it remains a growing conviction of mine, fueled 
by intellectual struggle with the issues posed by globalization, char chis 
must be done for the well-being of the peoples of the earth. These too 
would, or could, be forms of grace for our day. 
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